• Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of A Competitive Process (with Thayer Morrill), revise and resubmit at Econometrica

  -Abstract appears in Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22)

• The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair (with Marek Pycia), under review

• Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real-Goods Experiment Matching Experiment (with Andrew Kloosterman), under review

  -Abstract appears in Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC23)

• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments (with Marek Pycia)

• Strategyproof, Pareto Efficient, and Fair Allocation: Beyond Random Priority (with Marek Pycia)

Publications

• Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism

  Journal of Mathematical Economics (2024), 113:103015

• A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design (with Marek Pycia) Supplementary Appendix

  Econometrica (2023), 91(4):1495-1526

  -Best Paper Award at 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19) (watch the talk here)

  -Exemplary Theory Paper at 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

  -Abstract appears in Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

• Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment (with Andrew Kloosterman)

  EC ‘23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference and Computation (2023) (extended abstract)

• Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process (with Thayer Morrill)

  EC ‘22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2022) (extended abstract)

• School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance (with Andrew Kloosterman)

  Theoretical Economics (2020), 15(3):1095-1133

• Essentially Stable Matchings (with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman)

  Games and Economic Behavior (2020), 120:370-390

• Obvious Manipulations (with Thayer Morrill)

  Journal of Economic Theory (2020), 185

  -Abstract appears in the Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

• Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles

  International Economic Review (2019), 60(3)

• Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies (with Daniel Fragiadakis)

  Games and Economic Behavior (2019), 114:232-252

• Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values

  Journal of Economic Theory (2017), 170:319-345

• Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints (with Daniel Fragiadakis)

  Theoretical Economics (2017), 12(2):863-908

• Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo)

  ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (2015), 4(1), Article 6

• Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare

  Games and Economic Behavior (2012), 75(2):936-947

• Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas (with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo)

  Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012) (2012), 3:1327-1328 (extended abstract)

• Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (with Fuhito Kojima)

  Japanese Economic Review (2011), 62:82-98 (refereed survey article)