School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman, Theoretical Economics (2020), 15(3):1095-1133

Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman, Games and Economic Behavior (2020), 120:370-390

Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill, Journal of Economic Theory (2020), 185

Abstract appears in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading CyclesInternational Economic Review (2019), 60(3)

Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Games and Economic Behavior (2019), 114:232-252

Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent ValuesJournal of Economic Theory (2017), 170:319-345

Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Theoretical Economics (2017), 12(2):863-908

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (2015), 4(1), Article 6

Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante WelfareGames and Economic Behavior (2012), 75(2):936-947

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas, with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012) (2012), pp. 1327-1328 [extended abstract]

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, with Fuhito Kojima, Japanese Economic Review (2011), 62:82-98 [refereed survey article]

Working Papers

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design, with Marek Pycia (2nd revise and resubmit, Econometrica)

Best Paper Award at ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

Exemplary Theory Track Paper Award at ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)

This paper was previously circulated under the title Obvious Dominance and Random Priority. The new version contains a more general model and many brand new results. Check it out. (Or just watch this video!)

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